A New Use of Architecture, the Political of Agamben's Common Use by Boano, C & Astolfo, G
ARQ 91  14 UC CHILE
a new Use of arcHitectUre 
the POlitiCal POteNtial Of agaMbeN’s COMMON use
Temporiuso. Lunetta Garden, Milan. Por / By ada Stecca, quartiere Isola, Porta Nuova.  
© Cantieri Isola
LEC T UR A S  15 RE ADINGS
Camillo Boano 
Director, MSc in Building and Urban Design in Development,  
The Bartlett Development Planning Unit, University College of London, Londres, UK
Giovanna Astolfo
Teaching Fellow, The Bartlett Development Planning Unit,  
University College of London, Londres, UK
In architecture, what does use mean? This article 
explores the theory of use in Giorgio Agamben’s works, 
confronting a series of oppositions between use, 
property, appropriation, use value and right to use, to 
finally reach a beyond-the-use condition of the common, 
where common is not just free to use, but rather free 
from use: a condition of pure availability.
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How do we define what is common today? One way to look at the 
common (or to define it) is through its use. We often understand the 
common as what is available (to use) for everybody. This does not 
necessarily imply that what is common is public; nor that it is usable by 
and useful for everybody. What is use then? 
For instance, use can refer to the appropriation of space, an excess 
of use, as it is related to the ‘right to use’: “the right to benefit from, 
to use, and to enjoy something which belongs to someone else or is 
held in common ownership, as long as it is not damaged or destroyed” 
(Elden, 2014). Use can refer to ‘re-use’ of a space or building, restoring 
its function, and therefore its availability, as in recent debates on 
vacancy (Bey, 2010) and temporary reuse (Inti, et al, 2014) in alternative 
architectural and urban practices (Cupers, 2010). Agamben’s theory 
though goes beyond the conventional concept of appropriation, and 
the utilitarian understanding of use. It opens to the possibility of a 
new ‘free use’ of the common (Agamben, 2000). Free use is what is 
restored to its original availability, after a process of separation. For 
instance, a private space is a space consecrated to private use by an 
act of separation from the common usage. How to restore its free use? 
By making it inoperative, or replacing its old practical use (or function) 
with a new use: a pure use without finality.
the use Of agaMbeN
Agamben’s earliest engagement with the issue of use occurs as a 
conventional Marxist critique in Stanzas, specifically in “The Dandy and 
the Fetish” essay, where Agamben posits that “the transfiguration of the 
commodity into an enchanted object is the sign that the exchange value 
is already beginning to eclipse the use value” (Agamben, 1993b). While this 
early account identifies an erosion of the possibility of use, it is oriented to 
challenging its underlying utilitarian presuppositions. Agamben’s earliest 
account of use is concerned with examining the possibility of a new 
relation to things that consists neither in a utilitarian conception of use nor 
in the logic of exchange (Murray, Whyte, 2011), certainly influenced by his 
personal and intellectual engagement with Debord, Benjamin and Adorno. 
Agamben suggests that in the “spectacle […] in which we are now living, in 
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which everything is exhibited in its separation from itself, then spectacle 
and consumption are the two sides of a single impossibility of using. What 
cannot be used is, as such, given over to consumption or to spectacular 
exhibition and […] the irrevocable loss of all use” (Agamben, 2007a:83-84). 
As such this empties out what Marx termed the ‘use value’ of commodities, 
leaving in place empty forms, freed from the need to be useful and 
thus available for a new, non-utilitarian use (Murray, Whyte, 2011). 
Later on, in the essay Profanations, he locates the source of the 
unhappiness he observes in consumer society in the fact that its 
inhabitants “consume objects that have incorporated within themselves 
their own inability to be used” (Agamben, 2007a:83). In The Coming 
Community, Agamben mentions use as a “manner neither generic nor 
individual […] the manner in which it passes from the common to 
the proper and from the proper to the common is called usage” and 
is associated with ethos and defines it using “free use of the proper” 
that, according to Holderlin’s expression, is “the most difficult task” 
(Agamben, 1993a:25). When linked to a political debate as in Means 
Without Ends, Agamben displaces such reflections beyond the concepts 
of appropriation and expropriation in order to think “the possibility 
and the modalities of a free use” (Agamben, 2000:116) in his critique of 
the false and exclusionary within the dialectic of proper1 and improper 
that characterizes the present we live in. As an alternative, he asks:
If instead we define the common […] as a point of indifference between 
the proper and the improper –that is, as something that can never be 
grasped in terms of either expropriation or appropriation but that can 
be grasped, rather, only as use– the essential political problem then 
becomes: ‘how does one use a common?’  (Agamben, 2000:116).
This political meaning is further elaborated in The Time That Remains 
where inspired by a Pauline reading of the early Christian political 
theology, and specifically of the word chresai [fa uso] is put in relation 
1 Aristotle in Politics, argues: “every article of property has a double way of using it; both uses are 
related to the article itself, but not related to it in the same manner—one is peculiar to the thing and 
the other is not peculiar to it. Take for example a shoe—there is its use as a shoe and there is its use as 
an article of exchange; for both are ways of using a shoe, inasmuch as even he that barters a shoe for 
money or food with the customer that wants a shoe uses it as a shoe, though not for the use peculiar 
to a shoe (proper use; uso proprio), since shoes have not come into existence for the purpose of barter.” 
The proper use and the free use represent the political message of resistance suggested by Agamben.
Temporiuso, P7. Milán, 2013 - 2016. Proyecto de reutilización temporal abierto al uso público / 
Temporary reuse project open to public use. © Filippo Romano
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with the definition of the messianic life2 hos me, “as if not”. The 
messianic vocation (klesis), Agamben explains, consists precisely in the 
re-vocation of any vocation; however, this re-vocation does not destroy 
or annihilate the factitious condition of the world but, rather, suspends 
it in the figure of the “as if not” (hos me, come non). Use is the form that 
this deactivation takes: “to live messianically means to use the klesis, 
and the messianic klesis is something that can only be used and never 
possessed” (Agamben, 2005a:31). Importantly, this use in the form 
of the ‘as if not’ has not merely a negative connotation: it does not 
constitute a new identity; rather, the ‘new creature’ is nothing but the 
use and the messianic vocation of the old identity. The old identity, the 
law or the dispositive is not replaced by a new one but only rendered 
inoperative and, in this way, opened to its ‘true use’ (Agamben, 
2005a:33). Precisely in this notion of the re-vocation (katargesis) which 
in St. Paul’s epistles describes the ‘fulfillment’ of the law at the arrival 
of the Messiah, comes from argeo, and thus from argos, and means 
“to render inoperative, to deactivate, to suspend the effectiveness” 
(Agamben, 2005a:91). As Salzani notes, “the fulfillment in the use is 
thus désoeuvrement, and messianic potentiality is precisely that which 
is not exhausted in its ergon but remains potential in a ‘weak’ form. 
Katargesis restores the works –the identities– to their potentiality by 
rendering them inoperative” (Salzani, 2013).
This true use is neither the Marxian use-value nor the utilitarian 
concept of Antonio Negri, rather is a deactivation of the use3 much closer 
to the Franciscans who refuse all forms of property and right in favor of a 
usus pauper, a restricted “use without right” (Agamben, 2005a:27). In such 
a use without legal authorization, Agamben sees the possibility of a form 
of subtraction from law, rather than an open conflict with it. This recalls 
his debt to Paul, who framed the nullification of substantive vocations 
introduced by the messianic vocation as a form of use (Attell, 2014), 
2 We do not have time to engage in a detailed explanation of the messianic dimension of Agamben’s 
philosophy however for the sake of clarity, for Agamben, a truly messianic time, is a “time of the 
now” because the messianic event is not something to be awaited but something that already is. For 
Agamben, the time to which we must direct our attention is not something that, from a chronological- 
representational perspective, is forever “to come,” but rather something that has already happened and 
is always already happening in the present. Messianic for Agamben does also qualify a transformation 
a “messianic transformation of the law through katargēsis, therefore, is a matter of rendering it 
inoperative, suspending its “work”. (Attell, 2014). 
3  “Use”, Agamben suggests, is the very definition Paul gives of the messianic life that follows this 
nullification. While the substance of this reading of Paul is derived from Heidegger’s 1921 lecture 
Characteristics of Early Christian Life Experience, Agamben nonetheless utilizes the Pauline conception 
of use in opposition to Heidegger’s “appropriation”. 
Borei Keila. Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 2014. Espacio en planta baja apropiado informalmente por 
residentes que ponen en arriendo sus propiedades en el edificio / Ground floor space informally 
appropriated by residents who rent out their flat in the formal building. © budd students 2014-2015
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exhorting the Corinthians: “Art thou called being a slave? Care not for it: 
but if thou majesty be made free, use it rather”.4 In The State of Exception 
Agamben suggests that “what is found after the law is not a more proper 
and original use value that precedes the law, but a new use that is born 
only after it. And use, which has been contaminated by law, must also be 
freed from its own value”; as what opens a passage toward justice is not 
the erasure of law, “but its deactivation and inactivity [inoperosità]—that 
is, another use of the law. This is precisely what the force-of-law (which 
keeps the law working [in opera] beyond its formal suspension) seeks to 
prevent” (Agamben, 2005b:64).
In The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-of-Life (2013), 
Agamben offers a superb interpretation of the message of Francis and 
of the Franciscan theory of poverty and use suggesting again clearly the 
very political task of the present: how to think a form-of-life, a human 
life entirely removed from the grasp of the law and a use of bodies and of 
the world that would never be substantiated into an appropriation. What 
is so outrageous and deeply political in the highest poverty practiced by 
the Franciscans? What leads and what makes life according to Franciscan 
brothers? Those questions guided Agamben in discovering that the 
Franciscan rule is a life that coincides with his own form, a life that is a 
form-of-life. From a legal point of view the form-of-life can be achieved 
only through the abdicatio omnis iuris, or the renunciation to any form 
of law. The only practice that can be maintained –which allows the very 
survival of the individual– is the use of things. With an unprecedented 
radicalism, use is contrasted here with property, as it does not simply 
represent a different way of owning but a theory of relationship with 
4 (I Cor. 7:17–22) cited in Whyte dictionary. 
Beirut. Litoral / coastline. © Michele Spatari, dpu Summerlab 2015
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the world that is independent from the paradigm of appropriation. A 
Franciscan’s existence is outside the law, or an existence for which the body 
of the individual can never be captured by the legal arrangement, a non-
available body [indisponibile]. For the Franciscans there is no such thing as a 
form of economic life or a form of legal life, rather there is simply a form-of-
life that makes it impossible for the appropriation but only use. Tracing the 
different emergences of usus pauper –a poor use where “the perfection of 
the rule consists in the renunciation of ownership and not in the scarcity of 
use” (Agamben, 2013:56)– usus facti, the simple act of using something, and 
simplex usus as a de fato use separated by a legal usus (property) are simply 
syntagms that signify the relationships of non appropriation of the human 
with the world. Agamben’s research around the ontology of use continues as 
he indicates that Franciscans simply define and characterize use as opposed 
to the right to property. In such expansion, he renders visible possible 
resistances, inversions and deactivations to bio-economic capture of the 
bodies and the practice of a purely economic regime (Papa, 2013).
In The Coming Community, Agamben frames the non-identitarian 
singularity that he sees as central to a politics and a form of community 
that could escape the hold of the state as “a new use of the self” 
(Agamben, 1993a:28). The formulation of a singularity that ‘makes 
use’ of itself, rather than being bound within a naturalized and/or 
politicized identity, is contrasted to a substantive identity that could be 
represented and granted juridical rights. This point is certainly related 
to the discussion on potentiality, as in Agamben’s view a politics based 
on substantive identities fixes its pre-given constituencies rather then 
allowing for changes and transformations in which we could “hope to be 
other then we are” (Whyte, 2013). A new use of the self then would imply 
the denaturalization and desacralization of the self, which would exist 
Beirut. Litoral / coastline. © Dan Daley, dpu Summerlab 2015
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as a pure singularity rather than as an instance of a particular identity. 
It is however in the In Praise of Profanation that Agamben clarifies the 
concept when he suggests that the “creation of a new use is possible 
only by deactivating an old use, rendering it inoperative” through an act 
of profanation (Agamben, 2007a).
Agamben’s Homo Sacer project has been recently complemented 
with two publications not yet translated in English: L’uso dei Corpi 
(2014) – Homo sacer IV, 2, and the long awaited Stasis. La guerra civile 
come paradigma politico Homo Sacer, II, 2. L’uso dei Corpi [The usage 
of bodies] seems a closer reflection around the notion of use not only 
in the Aristotle’s basic division between soul [anima] and body but 
also outlining a double significance of the role of the body [corpo], 
declining modes ‘of use’, up to theorizing ‘a dual form of doing’ [forma 
del fare]. In the first part of the book Agamben sets forth Aristotle’s 
theory of slavery as the privileged locus for the development of 
the theory of use, which is indeed revealed in ‘the use of bodies’ 
drawn from Aristotle’s discussion of slavery in his Politics. Agamben 
found that the syntagm ‘the use of the body’ written in the opening 
sentences of Politics is engaged in the definition of slavery:
(…) who is a human being belonging by nature not to himself but to another 
is by nature a slave, and a person is a human being belonging to another if 
in being a man he is an article of property, and an article of property is an 
instrument for action separable from its owner (Aristotle, 1916 [1254]:15). 
Agamben observes that the ‘body of the slave’ [corpo dello schiavo] in 
ancient Greek is intended as an instrument, as in “those whose business is 
to use their body, [l’essere la cui opera è l’uso del corpo] and those who can 
do nothing better”, and it is here that Agamben sees enegeia and chresis, 
being-in-use and use, being juxtaposed as psyche and soma, body and 
soul.5 Aristotle refers to slaves as ‘living tools’.6 Such reflection emerges 
from another term Agamben brings back from Aristotle’s work: ktesis 
(tools, instruments, furnishings), which render in themselves the possibility 
of property, the potential of being owned. However he translates the 
term ktema as “something that is beneficial for everyone’s life” specifying 
that beneficial means “everything you can make use of”, clearly detaching 
use from property (Agamben, 2014). Coupling slave with instrument and 
5 The original tension between energeia, the being-at-work of man and dynamys, and  
potentiality -which was originally a tension between being-at-work and being-in-use (chresis)-  
are mutually influenced.
6 Slaves receive the guidance and instructions that they must have in order to live, and in return they 
provide the master with the benefits of their physical labour, not least of which is the free time that 
makes it possible for the master to engage in politics and philosophy. 
Recetas Urbanas, Sevilla, España. Construcción ilegal en la azotea de un edificio /  
Illegal rooftop construction. © Santiago Cirugeda
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defining it as furnishing is achieved by detaching them from the instruments 
which are not producing something, but simply their use. That is, their use 
is not for producing something but is rather a simple praxis.7  For this reason 
Agamben writes “the use of the body and the absence of practical use 
(opera) are something more, or rather different from a productive activity 
and they resemble and keep the paradigm of a human activity that is not 
reducible neither to labour, production or praxis” (Agamben, 2014a:35) but 
as a form-of-life. As such Agamben suggests that it is possible that “the 
use of the body is situated in the threshold between zoè and bios, between 
oikos and polis, physis and nomos, that the slave is an operative figure that is 
caught in the law yet to be cull (delibare)” (Agamben, 2014a:74). In this stage 
of reflection Agamben illustrates again (2007:1) that the notion of work 
(opera) emerges before in the slave rather than in the artist or any other 
creative figure, as the slave is by definition someone without ergon (opera/
work) and its ergon is the very use of the body which makes the slave born 
with no work (argos). Later in a more recent translated works, Agamben 
returns to the reflection on use and ‘to use’ suggesting that they are 
terms that modernity has invested with a strong ‘utilitarian’ connotation, 
transforming their original sense that was not present in the Greek term 
chresthai [to use] which “does not seem to have a meaning of its own, but 
derives its meaning from the term that follows it, that it is found in the 
dative or in the genitive, and never, as we would expect, in the accusative”.8 
The verb chresthai, Agamben discovers, is classified by grammarians as a 
‘middle voice’, that is, neither active nor passive, but the two together. 
Crucial in this etymological research is that in this ‘middle’ perspective, 
(…) the object of the verb chresthai cannot be in the accusative, but is always 
in the dative or the genitive. The process does not travel from an active 
subject toward the separate object of its action, but implicates in itself the 
subject, in the same measure in which it is itself implied in the object and ‘is 
given’ to it. (Agamben, 2014b:69) 
The result is thus a radical transformation of the ontology of the concept 
of ‘subject’. Not a subject that uses an object, but a subject that constitutes 
itself only through the using, the being in relation with another. The subject 
that is constituted in this use is both ethical and political, a subject that 
7 Aristotle speaks of the slave also as a part of the master –even as a separated part of the master’s 
body, for Agamben this use of the body is not to be intended as productive but rather in its practical 
version, so it is not that strange to speak of a tool as an extension of the body– if, for example, I use 
a stick as a probe to explore an otherwise inaccessible space. Prosthetic devices may be external or 
internal: my deficient eyesight is assisted by the lenses in my glasses, and by lenses implanted in my eyes. 
The implants have become part of my body; the functionally equivalent external lenses are separated 
parts of my body. From the master’s point of view, then, the slave is ‘as it were a part and detachable tool 
of the master’; specifically, he is a detached instrument for action.
8 To support this reflection Agemben lists several meanings as chresthai theoi, literally ‘to make use 
of god’ that is, to consult an Oracle; chresthai nostou, literally ‘to use (the) return’, that is, to experience 
nostalgia; chresthai logoi, literally ‘to use language’ that is, to speak; chresthai symphorai, literally ‘to 
use misfortune’ that is, to be unlucky; chresthai gynaiki, literally ‘to use a woman’ that is, to have sexual 
relations with a woman; chresthai you polei, literally ‘to make use of the city’ that is, to participate in 
political life; chresthai keiri, literally ‘to use the hand’ that is, to strike with the fist. (Agamben, 2014b)
“(...) use is contrasted here with property, as it 
does not simply represent a different way of 
owning but a theory of relationship with the 
world that is independent from the paradigm of 
appropriation. A Franciscan’s existence is 
outside the law, or an existence for which the 
body of the individual can never be captured by 
the legal arrangement (...)”
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testifies the affection received insofar as it is in relation with another 
body. Use, in this sense, “is the affection that a body receives inasmuch 
as it is in relation with another body (or with one’s own body as other)” 
(Agamben, 2014b:79). In concluding the first part of the L’Uso dei Corpi, 
Agamben connects the circular link between use and care [uso e cura] 
already developed in Heidegger and Foucault: 
The slave is, on the one hand, a human animal (or human-animal), and on 
the other and to the same extent, a living instrument (or a man-tool). The 
slave is, that is, in the history of anthropogenesis, a dual threshold: the 
animal life transfix in the human as well as the live (the man) pierces in the 
inorganico (the instrument). (Agamben, 2014a:59) 
What seems central in the reflection on use is that, as for Foucault the 
subject is not a substance but a process, “the ethical dimension, the care 
of the self does not have an autonomous substance: it does not have 
other relationship that the one of use between the man and the world” 
(Agamben, 2014a:58) where the subject of the chresis is “entering in a 
relation with the self and the world” (Agamben, 2014a:49). 
After having situated the use of the body of the slave in a threshold 
that approximates the practice, or the form-of-life of ‘use’ to those 
in care, Agamben reflects on the conditions for thinking the use 
as a ‘fundamental political category’ liberated from its intended 
instrumental nature ascribing it to its original mode of ‘inoperative 
enjoyment’, anticipating and connecting to the very core of his research 
Temporiuso, P7. Milán, 2013 - 2016. Proyecto de reutilización temporal abierto al uso público /  
Temporary reuse project open to public use. © Maura Tacchinardi - hc
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the rendering inoperative of the different exclusionary mechanisms. The 
book then moves into a fascinating examination of hermeneutics that 
Agamben develops, linking Foucault’s care of the self with the problem 
of appropriation (Ereignis) and Heidegger’s Dasein connected with the 
Franciscan practice –already outlined in The Highest Poverty–, Walter 
Benjamin, Husserl and Levinas, Spinoza and Hölderlin, and all the theoretical 
apparatuses constant in Agamben’s oeuvre, in order to strengthen the 
sense of use, declined as an ‘inoperative category’, whose form-of-life 
and specifically human practices are able to turn off the juridical and 
governmental dispositive, since “it is never a common property, but only 
that which cannot be appropriated” what helped –along the entire route of 
modernity– to deform the ethos [abito] of the living human, given that: 
(…) the use is the form in which the habitus gives existence, beyond the simple 
opposition between power and being-in-opera. And if the habitus is, in this 
sense, always already in use by itself and if this [...] implies a neutralization of 
the opposition subject/object, then there is no place here for an individual 
owner of the habitus, which can decide to put or not put in place. The self 
is constituted in relation to use, is not a subject, is nothing more than this 
relation. (Agamben, 2014a:102).
What seems to emerge in Agamben’s reflection is that use “constitutes 
an inoperative practice (pratica inoperosa) that can happen only when the 
Aristotelian dispositive potentiality/actuality, that assigns the supremacy 
to energeia, to the being-at-work, is deactivated” and profanated 
(Agamben, 2014a:130).
PrOfaNiNg aN aCt Of COMMON use
Agamben’s notion of profanation is a way to open up new uses and modes 
of politics (Boano, Talocci, 2014). In Agamben’s view, to profane means 
to return sacralized objects to free use. As religion separates things from 
the common sphere through sacrifice, capitalism also enacts the pure 
form of separation by making everything a commodity, impossible to use. 
In the sphere of consumption, profanation is, by contrast, what restores 
the common use by neutralizing the apparatuses of power through 
subversion9 of meaning. This is not unlike the Situationists’ détournement 
–which heavily influenced Agamben– offering a drift to a totally different 
meaning, a critique of the capitalist commodification of all aspects of life 
through the misappropriation of existing spaces with well-defined uses, 
able to determine “a use that is different from the one the capital had 
‘assigned’ to that particular piece of urban fabric” (Forty, 2000:23).
9 Subversion and profanation thus seem to avoid the reductionist discourse of an architecture 
that magically generates enjoyment of Lefebvre who, hostile to this spatial fetishism (an abandoned 
warehouse, he says, can be quickly turned into a place of celebration) alludes to Hill’s ‘illegal architect’ 
that subverts the conventions and “[…] considers how space is occupied rather than its form, and 
encourages inappropriate uses”. (Hill, 1998).
“To profane, in this sense, means freeing 
things from the ‘sacred names’ that set them 
apart as benefit of the few, to return them to 
their ‘free’ or ‘common usage’. This makes 
clear that the ‘usage’ in question is not 
simply one with a more ample or liberal legal 
definition, but one that categorically rejects 
the idea of legitimate ownership (...)”
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To profane, in this sense, means freeing things from the ‘sacred names’ 
that set them apart as benefit of the few, to return them to their ‘free’ or 
‘common usage’. This makes clear that the ‘usage’ in question is not simply 
one with a more ample or liberal legal definition, but one that categorically 
rejects the idea of legitimate ownership: this ‘lawless usage’ is not a 
purely anarchic one, but it is one that rejects the paradigms offered by the 
juridical culture of its day and carries the revolutionary implication that 
‘lawful usage’10 was far from just (De la Durantaye, 2008). 
In the book In Praise of Profanation, Agamben defines the gesture 
of profanation as one that can return to the free use of mankind what 
had been previously taken away from it, confined to the inaccessible 
sphere of the sacred. For Agamben, to profane something is a positive 
act for the simple reason that it liberates things and practices for 
communal usage: a “pure, profane, and liberated from sacred names 
[dai nomi sacri] is the thing returned to the common use of mankind” 
(Agamben, 2007a:83). He suggests that “one day humanity will play 
with the law as children play with disused objects, not in order to 
restore them to their canonical use but to free them from it for 
good” (Agamben, 2007a:65). ‘Free usage’ is thus communal and even 
communist usage, but it is also more than this and its understanding 
implies a new conception of the categories of law and usage. 
Profanation “neutralizes what it profanes […] deactivat[ing] the 
apparatuses of power and return[ing] to common use the spaces that 
power had seized” (Agamben, 2007a:77); this idea of profanation also 
makes possible the concept of ‘gesture’, which Agamben comes to 
define via an alternative reading of the two sides of Aristotle’s famous 
distinction between action [praxis] and production [poiesis] in which 
gesture is neither a production nor an enactment but is “undertaking 
and supporting […] breaking the false alternative between means 
and ends” (Agamben, 2000:155). Again in In Praise of Profanations a 
pure means is defined as “a praxis that, while firmly maintaining its 
nature as a means, is emancipated from its relationship to an end; it 
has joyously forgotten its goal and can now show itself as such, as 
a means without an end” (Agamben, 2007a:87). But in the capitalist 
‘society of spectacle’ nothing is as fragile and precarious as the 
sphere of pure means because “[if] the apparatuses of the capitalist 
cult are so effective, it is not so much because they act on primary 
behaviors, but because they act on pure means, that is, on behaviors 
that have been separated from themselves and thus detached from 
any relationship to an end. In its extreme phase, capitalism is nothing 
but a gigantic apparatus for capturing pure means”, recounting on the 
double gesture of indistinction “which have diverted them from their 
possible use” (Agamben, 2007a:92). As such, it is the task of a new 
politics to free pure means from the control mechanisms that have 
taken and imprisoned them. How can this be achieved? Agamben 
here suggests a way forward which will be central to a progressive 
political project –not only a powerful tool of diagnosis– in stating 
that “The creation of a new use is possible only by deactivating an old 
use, rendering it inoperative” (Agamben, 2007a:87).
For Agamben, today’s political struggle is to make possible new 
forms of profanation in order to overcome today’s intensely secularized 
capitalist cult. Capitalism, then, according to Agamben, is nothing but 
a system for capturing things, objects, and people, in order to remove 
all possibility of singular use, that is, in order to make every aspect of 
life available for control and commodification. Agamben understands 
that the means by which this end is achieved –the control of a total 
consumption– has to be related to media and audiovisual devices 
(cinema and photography more specifically) because the “apparatuses 
of the media aim precisely at neutralizing this profanatory power of 
language as pure means, preventing language from disclosing the 
10 Once ascribed to the statements of Church and State.
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possibility of a new use” (Agamben, 2007a:88). Thus profaning for 
Agamben is specifically to render such separations inoperative, and this 
task is for him truly important up to the point that, “the profanation 
of the unprofanable is the political task of the coming generation” 
(Agamben, 2007a:92). Profanation fits into the overall totality of 
Agamben’s work in seeking to deactivate the apparatuses of power in the 
interest of a coming community which is only latent, present but perhaps 
unrealized; and involves a resistance that challenges the contemporary 
place of language.
CONClusiON 
Playing with the powerful conceptual apparatuses of Agamben’s ontology, 
applying the ideas of use and profanation to the realm of design and 
architecture –and the spaces they produce– would mean to return the 
practice itself to the everyday users of those spaces, and to discard the 
neoliberal exclusionary logic, which lately has created ‘alien’ environments 
and thus can open for a “radical inclusivity”: a new common (Boano, 2015). 
Agamben’s chain of adjectives –pure, profane, free– shows the intent of 
profanation and the reason why Agamben wishes to praise it. Its goal is 
to free things from the ‘sacred names’ that set them apart as the province 
of the few; it is to return the things of the world to their natural context: 
‘common usage’. In this respect, re-discovering and liberating Agamben’s 
architecture represents an indispensable tool for architects in search of a 
theoretical and critical framework for a renewed political practice and a 
common use. A new use of architecture. ARQ
